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PREFACE; This paper is part of the result cf the research the author 
is currently conducting on the Role of the Cooperative Movement in 
Uganda in the Economic Development of the Country. The purpose of 
this historical survey is firstly, to give a general view of the stages 
of development of the movement from its humble beginnings to the 
present time. No attempt is made here to discuss the various 
activities of the movement in any of its fields of operations. 
Secondly, the paper attempts to illustrate that the development 
of the movement in Uganda had its roots from the spontaneous 
activities of the Ugandans themselves, rather than through Government 
initiative and inspiration as is usually imagined, although at the 
moment, through Government's increasing paternalistic attitude 
towards the movement, the latter appears to have lost its spontaneity. 
One can then see that the encouragement the Government gave, and is 
giving to cooperatives, stemmed partly froffi the fact that African 
aspirations to enter the industry and commerce of this country as 
individuals or through cooperatives were thwarted in the past by the 
earlier•Administration and established interests, and partly from 
the Government's belief in the use of the movement as an instrument 
of economic and.social policy. 
INTRODUCTION: Cooperative participation in the commerce and industry 
of this country is seen for all intents and purposes, as an indigenous 
take-over of alien concerns, particularly, in the cotton industry. 
The history.of the movement is, therefore, tied up with African 
desire for the control of the industry and commerce of the country, 
coupled with indigenous opposition to the restrictions placed on free 
entry into the processing industries. This desire is exemplified in 
these words; "We Ugandans want to be in control of our own affairs. 
That is .why our Government favours and supports Cooperatives as the 
best way to develop the people share in the growth of Uganda. 
1. Uganda Cooperatives - People with a Purpose-Pamphlet issued by 
the Dept. of Cooperative Development, Kampala, page 2. 
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The redistribution of economic power which the formation of 
Cooperatives in the Country entailed, has not been brought about 
without some ugly scenes'." Mounting agitations by the Ugandans 
against the disabilities'placed on them had-led to some rioting and 
pillaging of alien business concerns. Speaking to a Drum Reporter 
about the 1949 Buganda riot, for instance, an M.P. who actively 
backed the trade boycott by the Bataka Party and the Uganda African 
Farmers' Union (UAEU) commented thus; "Our aim was to paralyse the 
Asian-dominated trade which would result in an African share of the 
trade". 
The methods employed in this agitation might be reprehensible 
because, as it is usual with rioting mobs, some unscrupulous 
elements took the chance "to steal and damage their fellow country-
2 
men's property for the mere fact of personal grudges." Yet it is 
true that if firm action had not been taken by the Ugandans them-
selves to make their grievances known, they would still have been 
precluded from the ginnery trade on grounds of lack of managerial 
ability. 
The Uganda Government now has it as its avowed policy to 
Africanise the economy through Cooperatives. The history of the 
Cooperative movement in the country can conveniently be divided into 
two parts, namely, 
(a) The period before 1945 and, 
(b) The period after 1945. 
In considering both strands in the history of the movement it 
should be borne in mind that under both colonial and indigenous rule, 
the Government of Uganda adopted a paternalistic attitude towards 
the economic development of the country? i.e. Government's control 
and direction of economic activities. Consequently, the private 
sector was not sufficiently encouraged. In the first strand, 
Government's paternalistic attitude, in the main, took the form of 
protecting non-African business concerns from competition,, by _•. 
restricting the entry of Africans into the cotton ginning industry, 
cold attitude towards cooperative development, followed by 
indigenous agitation against such restrictive practices as 
thwarted their legitimate aspirations. In the second strand, 
paternalism has taken the form of encouraging and nurturing 
cooperative development as a means of fostering African enterprise , 
in other words ,redressing the wrongs of the past.. The alternative 
measure, however, would have been to liberalise cotton ginning 
and licensing regulations, which could have helped small businessmen 
to have an early foothold in the commerce of the country, rather than 
1. East African Brum, July Issue 1966. 
2. Ibid. 
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direct encouragement of cooperative, a measure which now involves 
giving protection to another set of vested interests. This 
division is, however, not rigid, but is a convenient way of looking 
at the development of the movement in the country. 
THE PERIOD BEFORE 1945-
Although this period, from the point of view of colonial 
administrators, is considered as a period of lukewarm attitude to 
cooperatives, official policy towards African aspirations and 
cooperative endeavours was, by no means, unanimous. Pressure groups 
and individuals had different views on the matter. Vested interests 
like European and Asian ginaers always spoke against African 
enterprise, but in. official circles, different colonial administrators, 
at different times, thought differently in respect of African 
enterprise and cooperative organisations. Hence the view expressed 
by Hancock that "What has so far been proved is simply the fact that 
colonial idealists do not think alike".''" In the controversy raging 
in the 1910's between European coffee planters and some colonial 
administrators as regards the legitimacy, or otherwise, of 
encouraging alien coffee plantations in the country, to the 
detriment of African Coffee production, Erancis Spire, the Provincial 
Commissioner, Eastern Province in 1915? looked on the advent of 
3usoga European coffee planters "with cautions approval", and urged . p 
that "every development must be carried out by the natives". 
At its face value, this assertion was not clear whether 'development' 
was to be confined to crop raising. The view was more clearly 
stated later.by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Uganda in 
October 1921, in the following words: 
"As regards crops in Uganda, 
I consider the best policy is 
for the natives to grow these 
and for the Europeans to purchase 
and market them. This is, 
I believe the Director of Agricultrre1s 
view and it has proved to be the. 
correct one. 
Such a policy rather buttress the "primitive economic systems" 
1. Hancock, S.W.K. , Commonwealth Affairs, Lond. 1940, part 2, page 176. 
2. Wrigley, C.C., Crops and Wealth in Uganda, East African Studies, 
No.12, page 31. 
3. Ibid. page 40. 
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i against the "impact of the market economy," and if it had "been 
adopted wholly as an instrument of policy, .it would have reduced 
the natives to the position of mere producers of agricultural 
commodities. That could not be defended either on the principle of 
division of labour and specialisation or on grounds of economic 
advantages to the people. Apparently, some Ugandans in the ruling 
hierarchy had been led to believe that that was an acceptable policy. 
2 
For instance, the Head of the Kabaka's Government of Buganda spoke 
of "the verbal contract" between Government.and expartriate traders -
Asians and Europeans - in which "These traders were not allowed to 
set up cotton and coffee farms". "It was the responsibility of the 
Government to see that the people cultivated and sold their cotton 
to the Asian and European ginners".^ 
In line with this mode of thinking, restrictions were placed 
on African Commercial activities in Uganda, almost since the 
beginning of British Administration in the country. In 1901, petty 
trading was prohibited, a measure to keep the towns clean, thus 
"displaying a passion for tidiness."1 The 1902 law stipulated that 
no person was to trade without a liance, (except planters and farmers 
disposing of their produce from their farms). Under the Cotton Rules 
of 1910^itinerant•cotton buyers were forbidden from buying cotton 
from growers unless they were licensed. Cotton buying was.limited 
to Government approved markets. By the 1918 Cotton Rules! 
purchasing of raw cotton, keeping of any factory or store for 
purposes of processing cotton were all forbidden, unless by a licence 
issued by the District Commissioner of the District, who could, at 
his own discretion, refuse to issue such a licence, or revoke any 
such licence already issued. Lincensing of ginners as distinct from 
cotton buyers was achieved by the introduction of the Cotton Rules 
of 1920. Under section (27) of the Rule, "No person shall gin or 
bale cotton at any place within the protectorate unless he is in 
possession of a licence in respect of such place issued to him by 
the Director of Agriculture"; 
1. Ehrlich, C., Some Social and Economic Implications of Paternalism 
in Uganda, Journal of African History,. IV, 2, 1963? page 279-
2. Under the 1967 Constitution the Buganda Govt, has been dissolved. 
3. East African Drum, op.cit, 
4. Ehrlich, C. 00.cit. p. 280 -
5. Uganda Laws, 1902, No-.. 3 . of -190 2. 
6. The Rule was originally-for. non-natives, but was amended in the 
same year to include natives who served as agents or employees of 
those required to be licensed under the previous Rule - Uganda 
Gazettee, 1910, p. 182. The Rule was made under the Cotton Act of 
1908, No.5, 1908. 
7. Uganda Gazettee, 1918, No, 594 of 1918, p. 472. 
8. Uganda Gazettee, 1920, pp.491-497. 
It was not easy for Africans to obtain such-licences. The 
discouragement of middlemen's activities, including those of African 
middlemen in the cotton industry.and elsewhere had begun to occure 
in the 1920's and that "dampened incipient native enterprise"]" 
The first African to apply for a ginning licence in '1926 was refused 
a licence on the grounds that no further licences were to be issued. 
The Cotton Zoning legislation- and the Produce Marketing Ordinance, 
all "Consolidated.a rigid framework into which it was virtually a 
impossible for small-scale African entrepreneurs to penetrate. 
The Africans were, however, becoming restive and opposed to these 
restrictive tendencies. 
In the cotton industry processing was controlled by European 
and Asian businessmen who, in 1929? formed the Buganda Seed Cotton 
Buying Association,^ in order to protect their interests and 
preclude any competition in their trade. The Association, by mutual 
agreement amongst their members, shared the cotton market in 
proportion to ginning capacity. The areas of the market became 
known as Zones. Ginners also formed the Ginning Pools - voluntary 
associations - which controlled the Cotton Industry up to 1952-
The Buying Association and the Ginning Pools were- opposed by African 
public opinion represented by African growers and middlemen. An 
important development occurred in Busoga, with the formation of the 
Young Busoga Association (Y.B.A) which was a political pressure • 
group, as well as a trading concern, aimed at preventing the sale 
of Seed Cotton to the ginners association. Lack of efficient 
leadership, however, hampered the effectiveness of the Y.B.A. The 
literate elements in it, who could have been effective instruments 
in mobilising public opinion against the ginners were barred from 
participating in its activities; for instance, a Busoga Chief who 
was also the President of the Y.B.A. had to resign the membership 
of the group on Government's order, Government supported the Buying 
Association, although it was quite aware of.the growing African 
demands to participate in cotton processing, but it opposed African 
demands on the grounds that the Africans had not yet acquired 
managerial skills to be able to take the risk of owning processing 
plants. Some of the Ugandans themselves had been led to understand 
that the57" were incompetent in entrepreneurship. Even up to the 
post-war period, when official attitude had begun to change in favour 
of African participation in industry, some Ugandans still believed 
they were incapable of owning processing factories. A leading figure 
in the former Buganda Government, for example, had this, to say in 
1. Ehrlich, C._, op. cit. .p. 280.- ' 
,2. Ibid. 
3- The Buying Association did not become effective until the 1930's. 
connection with the '1949 Buganda riots. 
''You may say I was the cause of the disturbances. 
Why? Because I was t h e head of the Government 
who did not consent to the Bataka's demands. 
They wanted to gin their own cotton. 
I objected to this because there was nobody 
able to supervise the scheme of cotton 
processing? there was not a single chief who 
was capable of organising the ginneries. a 
Yet the Chief did not know that entrepreneurial ability is not 
an endowment, but rather acquired by practical application, and 
that expertise could be imported to run the ginneries owned by 
Africans. 
The incompetence of the African and his apparent lack of 
entrepreneurial talents in the pre-war years appeared to have been 
seen only in the short-run. The long-run view of the matter was 
not considered. Thus, the need to set up an educational infrast-
ructure and have a period of tutorship for would - be African 
businessmen was not considered. » 
In spite of the conviction in official and business circles of 
the African's lack of managerial skill, African agitation to 
participate in the industry and commerce of the country was not 
relaxed. Ginners had, in effect, constituted themselves into a 
monopsony with Government1s connivance, for Government had "decided 
that no action on its part was necessary" to prevent the monopsony, 
p 
"provided fair and reasonable prices were offered by the Association" 
Government's view on the Association and the growers was that both 
should unite under the guidance and assistance of Government "to place 
on a firm and secure foundation the cotton industry of Buganda""3 
How the two opposing interests could unite remained to be seen. 
Mounting opposition to the Buying Association led to the 
appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into the Cotton Industry 
in 1929. The major recommendations of the Commission centred around 
counselling protection for the Buying Association and are briefly 
as follows: 
1) That the price paid to the grower should be such as would 
bring some benefits to those who had staked their capital in the 
industry. The grower price in the 1920's, it said, was excessive, 
because of cut-throat competition amongst the buyers, and therefore, 
in the interest of the cotton industry and that of the country 
generally, it was in appropriate to revive "excessive competition.". 
1. East African Brum, op.cit. 
2. The Uganda Herald, March 16, 1928, p.6. 
3. Ibid.' 
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2) Although it agreed that there was the possibility of 
exploiting the growers by the Association, it suggested that 
Government "must take such s X GpS 3 s it reasonably can to. prevent 
the possibility of such exploitation".'1" In paragraph 103 the 
Commission stated that it was "of the opinion, therefore, that 
ginners must combine for the purpose of self-preservation; and that 
it is in the interests of the growers that such combinations should 
take place, provided always that proper safeguards are devised and 
enforced to ensure that fair prices are paid to them for cotton." 
show 
In no specific way, did the Commission/how the Buying Association 
was in.the interest of the growers. In actual fact, while compe-
tition, which the Association sought to curb and kill, had the 
effect of raising the growers price, "the 'Syndicates -were held 
responsible, not merely for low prices, but for increased customs 2 
duties and heavy taxes". In Buganda for example, where the 
Association was operating mostly, the grower received Shs. 20 per 
100 lbs of cotton, while in the Eastern Province and Jinja where 
there was competition, the price was Shs. 27 per 100 lbs of. cotton. 
It. was estimated in Buganda in 1928, that growers were 'paid, at lea'st, 3 
£136 ,400 less on their cotton than tht-y could get under competition. 
It was reported in 1928 that "This combine handled the bulk of the 
crop and some dissatisfaction was expressed by growers at the prices 
and lack of competition"^ Government was, therefore, urged by growers 
to abolish the Associations in the interest of those whom it protected. 
3) Another recommendation was that protection of the growers 
could take the form of Government decreeing minimum prices to be 
paid to the producers and "Government should make it an offence to 
sell cotton below the prices arrived at under the formula recom-
5 
mended" it is unrealistic, however to think that Government could 
protect the growers by decreeing minimum prices which, according 
to the formula, were to reflect processing costs; for these processing 
costs could conceivably be negotiated by the ginners to cover the 
higher-cost ginneries. . The- determination of processing costs, if 
it is to have any meaning in fixing prices, should be based upon 
efficiency, i.e., costs should be based on -what ought to be the basic 
and reasonable costs efficient production units are likely to incur. 
1. Report of'the Commission of Enquiry into the Cotton Industry 
in Uganda, 1929? p.19? parag. 111. 
2. Ehrlich, C., The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda pp.198/9. 
In African Circles the term syndicates was Synonymous with 
the Buying Associations. 
3. Ibid page 191 
4. Uganda Bept. of Agric. Annual Report, 1928, p.8 
5. 1929 Cotton Commission Report, op.cit. parag. 113. 
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This is "because, a firm may be. operating inefficiently, and so, has 
a higher level of costs, which, when taken into account in fixing 
its profit margin and therefore, the grower price, will ultimately 
reduce- the growers' returns. Associations too, could even delibera-
tely lower prices paid to producers since the ginning pools were in 
the position of a monopsonist. 
4) That facilities should be provided to enable the natives 
1 
to get their own ginneries. This recommendation was of some 
importance in African context. But.the Commission inadvertently, 
nullified its own recommendation when it added that Government 
should control the number of ginneries so as to avoid excess 
capacity. A Board was to be. formed "to decide on which ginneries 
are redundant." Limiting the number of ginneries with no provision 
for African acquisition of existing ginneries was in effect, another 
way of thwarting African demands to own ginneries. Pear had already 
been expressed as early as 1923 about excess capacity in the ginning 
industry. By 1925? Government's policy had centred around limiting 
the number of ginneries in any particular area according to the 
cotton output of that place. On economic grounds, it was argued 
'that'overcapitalisation would lead to excess capacity and, conse-
quently, to high processing costs which would reduce the profit 
margins. But on the other hand, over the years of undisputed control 
of the industry, the ginners would have been making abnormal profits, 
and the entry of other ginners into the trade would just reduce 
these profits to normal profits. The argument about excess capacity 
ignores, the, fact that free:, entry into ginning, by 
increasihg the number of ginneries, would stimulate cotton production, 
especially in new areas and provide sufficient cotton.for the 
ginneries. Also, if the industry is over-capitalised, then,. 
competition, by allowing free entry into the industry, would reduce 
the number of firms through the elimination of inefficient production 
units; factories that cannot pay their way would normally fizzle out 
of existence. Competition will therefore, lead to the closure of 
high-cost ginneries in areas of over capitalisation, while, at the 
same time, it will bring about the building of ginneries in new 
production areas," particularly, in the northern region, all leading 
to increased marketing efficiency. In this rationalisation process, 
resources released by the closure of inefficient ginneries could"be 
put into other productive uses, thus helping with development in 
other sectors of the economy. The closure of inefficient ginneries 
will again result in a higher throughput for the remaining production 
units, lower variable costs and ultimately, to higher profit margins. 
In effect, ginners need not lose in the event of competition being 
allowed in the ginning industry. 
1. Ibid. paragraph 123. 
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Quite naturally, the Africans rejected the Commission's 
recommendations. The most articulate of African public opinion, in 
•its opposition, was.the Association of Uganda Farmers which urged 
that natives should be-allowed to build new ginneries and that 
Government should buy off any ginnery that could not pay.its way and 
resell to Africans. Even the Kabaka of Buganda waded into the 
dispute and wrote to the Governor. "We do not approve- the 
Commission's recommendations ....... • 
The Native Produce Ordinance, 1932 and the Cotton Zone 
Ordinance, 1933. 
In the early 1930 's, the Uganda Administration -committed the 
country to a policy of further restriction of competition, not only 
for the purchase of cotton, but for other crops as well. This policy 
was introduced under the.. "Native Produce Marketing Ordinance", 1932. 
Under the Ordinance, the Administration was to issue licences for 
the purchase of crops in certain areas to one, or to a very limited 
number of buyers only. The restrictions were justified generally 
by Government, for reasons of quality. Part of a report of the 
Department of Agriculture, in 1929 reads thus: 
"..,.... Experience in Uganda with all native 
produce shows that where marketing is uncontrolled 
and where' there is in consequence a scramble at 
the place of sale, any attempt by the buyer to 
insist oil a higher standard of quality at the 
time of purchase from the grower is immediately 
nullified by the fact that competitive buyers are 
2 willing to purchase rejected produce." 
It should be realised however, that if a buyer buys a crop of 
inferior quality, he will eventually lose through lower returns when 
he sells it to the processors. The prospects of reduced returns 
which a primary buyer would get if he bought a crop of inferior 
quality should make him more selective in his buying; and even If he 
buys low grade crop, there is always the opportunity for the processor 
to whom he delivers it, to sort out the crop. This is especially 
true of coffee and cotton. Therefore crops of inferior quality at 
primary buying need not affect the final product, provided the 
processor too is selective. On the basis of this, Government's 
argument on restrictions.is not justified. 
In the cotton industry, competitive baring was abolished under 
the Cotton Zone Ordinance of 1933. The Ordinance divided the country, 
into fourteen different zones,^ namely, Mengo, Masaka, Mub.ende - Toro, 
1. Agric. Dept. Letter, N,37/1929, 9th'-Sect. 1929, quoted in 
Ehrlich op.cit. page 222. 
2. Uganda, Annual'Report of the Dept. of Agriculture, 1933. 
3. Kuiper, P.E.S , A Comparative Economic Analysis of Government1s 
Intervention in the Marketing and Ginning of Cotton" llTTTganda, 
h.--> ^.e'1: •• -' :->•" ""'A Rii~ "cla TJrunc i <• d:. oO. 
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West Nile-Madi, West Acholi, East Acholi, Bunyoro, North. Lango, 
South Lango, Busoga, North Central, Budama-South Central, South Teso 
and North Teso. Thus, the number of marketing areas for- cotton was 
reduced. Movement of raw cotton across the borders of the Zones 
was prohibited "for the purpose of preventing the spread of diseases, 
of maintaining the purity of the seed supply, and of preventing the 
admixture of different kinds of cotton.However, the impact of 
the ordinance was not confined to matters of quality of cotton or 
control of diseases. It., brought, about, the revival of the ginning 
pools. Zoning also strengthened the ginning pools as it curtailed 
the activities of middlemen. But although Zoning would limit 
competition among the ginners, yet competition persisted among them 
to get sufficient cotton, owing to one of the rules of the pools 
which prescribed penalities for under-buying. By this time also 
the Administration had ceased to impose conditions, on the pools as 
regards the rationalisation.of the cotton industry, contrary to the 
recommendations of the 1329 Commission. It was felt that the 
elimination of excess capacity and the removal of redundant ginneries 
should be left to the ginners themselves. The effect of this change 
of attitude was that, instead of any improvement, the industry 
2 
remained stagnant until 1952, because there was no official pressure 
exerted on the ginners to rehabilitate their ginneries. Ginneries 
that were even in appalling state, continued to make profits, thereby 
increasing the market value of the factories. The unjustified high 
profits of the ginners had added momentum to African agitation 
against the pools. 
In the Eastern Province, there had been formed, in 1934, the 
"Native Cultivators Association" of Budama. It was formed to press 
the demand for the abolition of the pools system. Native opposition 
to the Buying' Associations and the Ginning Pools had begun to change 
its emphasis.^ The main complaints, as from the 1930's, centred on 
lack of opportunities for African participation in cotton processing 
and marketing. 
Meanwhile, a group of Africans had, in 1930, formed the Baganda 
Cotton Company (BCC) and entered into an agreement with the Uganda 
Company for the purpose of obtaining loans from the latter to 
purchase cotton to be ginned by the Uganda Company. Thereafter, the 
BCC would purchase the Uganda Company's ginneries. The BCC exhibited 
great incompetence, which was inevitable anyway, at the initial stages. 
It finally failed and its failure dampened for a while, African 
enthusiasm for participation in cotton ginning and produced really 
1. Ibid. 
2. With the Government's proposal of 1951? followed by the 1952 Act, 
attention was foccussed on.the reorganisation of the cotton industry. 
,3. Before the. 1930 1 s, agitation was mainly for fair, prices. 
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evidence for the ginning pools to disparage African businessmen for 
lack of entrepreneurship.^ But the pools did not admit that by 
eliminating the middlemen, the available training' ground for 
entrepreneurship had been closed to the Africans. Nor was the 
incompetence of the Africans as was evidenced in the failure of 
the BCC sufficient justification for disparaging African businessmen 
for lack of managerial ability. Taking a long-term view of the 
whole situation should have changed official view in favour.of 
African participation. The early stages of African attempts to 
enter the business and commerce of the country could conceivably be 
taken as the period of trial and error. 
The Cotton Commission, 1938. 
The Cotton Commission of 1938, among other things, considered 
the case of the middlemen and confirmed that "no useful purpose 
would be served by their re-entry into the cotton trade." It 
recommended that African growers' who wished to gin and bale their 
cotton so that they could market it on their own account should be 
given.facilities to do so. But it' observed that growers were 
unlikely to,produce sufficient cotton to make a commercial 
consignment, hence combination between a number of growers would be 
necessary. It- condemned the activities of the "so-called cooperative 
societies" which it dismissed as inefficient, for they lacked 
2 "knowledge of tne elementary principles of business'.' 
Such cooperative societies had been formed in Buganda for the 
marketing of cotton. In effect, the Commission was against 
Cooperative marketing of cotton by the natives. It described them 
as "irregular middlemen" and warned that if the movement .were 
allowed to develop, the existing marketing system would be seriously 
jeopardised. It was, therefore, more concerned with the maintenance 
of the "Status quo" than with finding any realistic way of redressing 
the grievances.of the people. "On purely economic grounds" the 
report went on, 
"there is nothing to be said in favour of the 
encouragement of the cooperative cotton societies; 
on the other hand, we appreciate that on political " 
and educational grounds the time may arrive when 
it may be expedient to foster and encourage 
cooperative undertakings!'^ 
The African, the commission argued could own a ginnery within 
the existing business framework, rather than setting up another form 
of organisation "incompatible with the existing ...structure of .the-
industry."4 But evidence showed that it would be impossible for the 
1. Uganda Herald, May 23rd, 1930. . , . • 
?. Uganda, Report of the-Commission of Enquiry into the Cotton 
Industry, 1938, pp. 77-78. '• ... ' •-' 
3. Ibid. -p. 79. . _.. 
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African to acquire ginneries under the existing structure, in view 
of the already heavily entrenched vested interests with which they 
could not compete. Lack of managerial skill had brought about the 
demise of early attempts at African enterprise. To overcome this 
deficiency, the commission recommended that facilities should be 
provided so that Africans could train as apprentices "with the object 
of qualifying suitably selected individuals for ultimate entry into 
business in a controlling capacity"^" G-ood as that suggestion might 
sound to the Commission, it was, perhaps, forgotten by the 
Commission that it had considered the middlemen's functions and 
African Cooperation inimical to the existing marketing structure 
and discouraged them, yet it was through such activities that the 
Africans could have acquired some practical business knowledge and 
methods. 
In the midst of these restrictive tendencies, some opposite 
views were being noticed in official circles, and some official 
support for cooperative development and African entry into the 
ginning endustry was forthcoming. A government official had once, 
observed in respect of the Baganda, that failure to allow for 
development on cooperative lines in the cotton industr5r would not 
only limit the scope of such people but would exclude almost the only 
means by which the Baganda could acquire economic education and 
enter the marketing branch of the cotton industry in the country 
with any chance of success. Also, noticing the danger of the racial 
division in the cotton industry, the Provincial Commission of Buganda, 
in 1938, urged that Africans should be allowed to own ginneries and 
that if tiie venture failed, it would serve as an object lesson to 
the African "as to the difficulties connected with the Industry and 
2 
the genuineness or otherwise of Government's intentions". This 
advice was ignored by the Administration. 
Were the Ugandans as unenterprising^ as they were portrayed to 
be, such consistent and sustained agitation against the restrictive 
market system could not have emanated from them. Because of the 
injustice seen in their being discriminated against in favour of 
non-Africans said to possess more managerial skill than they, 
agitations by the Ugandans were coloured with a tinge of politics. 
In spito of these restrictions imposed on African enterprise 
and the thwarting of cooperative efforts in the name of saving the 
cotton industry from ruin, some cooperative activities were, 
nevertheless going on. The first attempt at cooperative activity 
1. Ibid, p.80 
2. Uganda Bept. of Agric. Entebbe, Pile 23, P.C." Buganda, 17th 
August, 1938, quoted in Ehrlich, op.'cit. page 269 
3. Lucy P, Ma'ir, An African People in the - 20th-Century^ 
London, 1934, page 152. 
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went as far "back as 1913? when four African farmers in Singo County 
1 
of Buganda formed the "Kinakulya Growers' Society"' for the purpose 
of marketing their crops cooperatively. The next stage came with 
the formation of "the Buganda Growers' Association" in 1923 by five 
Baganda farmers. It was the first cooperative society with a 
continuous history. The object of the society was to provide an 
•effective instrument•to present the views of African growers to the 
Government in the face of powerful vested interests springing up in 
the eotton industry, especially,' the "Combine". It would appear 
from their objective that the Buganda Growers' Association was, in 
the early stages, more of a political organisation than a commercial 
concern.. Ten years afterwards, the Buganda Growers' Association 
levied a fee of Shs.2/- on its members to raise funds. Cooperative 
marketing of cotton was attempted in 1931, but with disastrous 
results, and so, no crop marketing was attempted in the following 
year. The Association was reconstructed in 1933 under the name of 
the "Uganda Growers' Cooperative Society" at the instance of one 
Mr. Mikairi Wamala, M.B.E. (1879-1963). Its membership was drawn 
from the various counties of Buganda and it formed the nucleus of 
what later came to become separate primary societies which together 
formed the Uganda Growers'Cooperative Union registered in 1948. By 
1936, the Uganda Growers' Cooperative Society had got a membership 
of 239 people, and nineteen other growers' societies had been formed. 
These early societies had no legal backing, neither were they 
registered, nor supported by Government. They were operating under 
the Business Names Ordinance, "a most unsatisfactory situation", 
since their activities could neither be supported nor controlled by 
law. 
As far back-as 1934, cooperative development had engaged the 
attention of the Uganda Administration. A draft Bill on cooperative 
societies had been drawn up in 1935 and revised in 1937, but was 
strongly opposed on the grounds that cooperative legislation was yet 
inopportune in the country, and so,, was dropped, pending an 
investigation of the .whole situation. The immigrant community argued 
that the formation of a cooperative movement would be attended by 
"grave risks"; that the proposed societies would involve the 
Government in indirect participation in commerce; that the societies 
might grow in size and become politically powerful and hence a source 
of embarrassment to the Administration; that the societies might 
2 indulge in unfair competition with established business. Further• 
1 . The ...most. articulate--parts -of-Uganda "in all these struggles have 
been Buganda and the Eastern Provinces. 
2. Engholm, G.E., The Decline of Immigrant Influence on the -
Uganda Administration., 19.45-1953, Uganda Journal, pt.I, .1967. 
Mr. Engholm was-describing, in his article, the'pre-war 
situation also. . . . . -
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grounds for dropping the Sill were that the Africans lacked 
entrepreneurial ability and that cooperat iv e a ctivlties 
would bring too much money into African hands and that would cause 
inflation, in the country. . In the years that followed, a more 
favourable attitude towards cooperatives developed as a result of 
official reports and recommendations of-experts who enquired into 
the question. In 1938,-Mr. J.W. Steil carried out an investigation 
on the introduction and regulation of the cooperative movement in 
the country. His investigation showed that there had been a number 
of-societies of a semi-cooperative nature in existence, but* that 
their operation left much to be desired and he stressed that 
cooperative development must be preceded by cooperative education. 
The second world war prevented any action on the report. 
Further investigation in 1941 into the food crop industry 
showed evidence of local demand and possibilities of establishing 
•agricultural marketing societies and the need for cooperative 
legislation to regulate their activities. This fact was confirmed by 
Mr. W.K.H. Campbell, who, in 1944, conducted a further investigation 
into the opportunities for cooperative development In the country. 
He showed that there was plenty of scope for cooperatives to operate 
ana he declared "that the demand here is so insistent 
and the present position in many cases 
so dangerous and so legally unsound, 
thair I venture to suggest that a very 
high priority ought to be given to the 
need for passing an ordinance and 
selecting and training a registrar 
to administer it" 
The Legislative Council debated and passed the Cooperative Bill 
in December 1945. Opposition to the Bill came mainly from the 
Indian Community represented by Honourable H.K. Jaffer, who feared 
that the passage of the Bill was an attempt "to eliminate the 
Indian trader from his legitimate and rightful pursuits in trade".^ 
Here was demonstrated once more, a dichotomy of interests. 
Government's sponsorship of cooperatives was seen by non-African 
vested interests as'inimical to them. 
THE PERIOD AFTER 1945. 
With the enactment of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1946^, 
and its being brought into effect by Legal Notice, No.157 of 1946, 
as from 1st September 1946, there came to axn end the era of 
illegitimate cooperative societies. The Department of Cooperative 
1. Par. Proceedings, Uganda, 4th Dec. '1945, pp.37-38. 
,2. Ibid, page 39. 
3. Uganda laws, 1946, Ordinances and • Subsidiary Legislation;. " 
Cooperative Societies Ordinance-, No. 5 of 1946, pi . 13-27. 
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Development was, accordingly, created in the same year, to advise 
on policies and ...programmes, and Mr. A.J. Kerr was appointed • 
Registrar, with effect from 1st January 1946. Under the Ordinance, 
a Society which has for its objects the promotion of the economic 
interests.of its members in accordance with cooperative principles .. 
may be registered with or without limited .'liability.When registered, 
such a society becomes a body corporate with all the rights of 
a corporate body. Registered Societies were to be granted tax 
remission^ on their transactions involving duty or tax, stamp duty or 
any fee payable under the law of registration for the time being in 
force. Dividend payable to members was not to exceed 10$ per annum 
in any case. Societies which mode profits were to maintain a reserve 
fund into which should be paid such portion of the net-profit in 
each year as may be prescribed. The net balance of any society after 
payment of dividends and -payment into the reserve fund was to be 
distributed in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Ordinance 
or in accordance with the by-flaws of the society. In no case should 
dividends and bonuses be paid until the Balance Sheet of the Society 
had been certified by the Registrar and the amounts payable approved 
by the Registrar. Section 41 (l) of the Act stipulated that "The 
Registrar may, with the approval of the Governor, appoint a person 
to supervise the affairs of any registered society who shall be 
called a Supervising manager". Such a supervising.manager was to be 
a member of the committee and his vote at meetings, though subject 
to appeal to the Registrar, was to be deemed a majority vote. 
Officers or members of a registered society were barred from receipt 
of any remuneration, salary, commission, or other payment from any 
person other than the society in respect of any business or 
transaction entered into by the society. Under section 62 of the 
ordinance, "The provision of the companies ordinance and of the 
Registration of Business Names Ordinance shall not apply to a 
registered society." 
The first cooperative society to be registered under the new 
law was the Namutamba Growers' Cooperative Society, "thus ending the 
era of uncertainty and insecure standing for farmers' organisations". 
By the end of 1946, about 75 organisations of a cooperative nature, 
were in operation and were mainly agricultural marketing societies, 
the majority of which were located in Buganda, but most of them were 
still unregistered. Outside Buganda, the first cooperative attempt 
at coffee (Arabica) marketing.in the country was in Bugisu, where 
there was established in 1931, under the.aegis of the Government, an p organisation known as the Bugisu Scheme , for the proper cultivation, 
_ 1 
1. Since 1966, Cooperative .Societies have been subjected to payment < 
of income tax. 
2. The History of the Bugisu Coffee Scheme (typed . copy).. * 
Its parallel organisation outside Uganda was the Kilimanjaro 
Native Cooperative Union, Tanzania. 
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processing and marketing, of the crop in Bugisu. Although the Scheme 
was not launched as a cooperative venture then, there was a proviso 
that it should be converted into a cooperative organisation "at the 
earliest opportunity". With the enactment of the cooperative 
ordinance, two primary societies of coffee growers sprang up in 
Bugisu for the purpose of collecting parchment coffee prepared by-
members for sale in a bulk to the Bugisu Coffee Scheme, and for that, 
they received a commission of one cent per pound over and above the 
controlled price. .Payment for the coffee so delivered was made 
according to grade, so as to provide an incentive for the production 
of good quality coffee. In addition to the commission, premiums 
were paid to the societies for quality, the premiums being based 
upon the Nairobi Liquorer1s: reports on. samples taken and tested. 
Between 1-951 and 1955 Government took steps to develop the Bugisu 
Coffee industry on a cooperative basis. Certain assets belonging 
to the Scheme were transferred to the Biigisu Cooperative Societies 
which/formed the Bugisu Cooperative• Union,- registered in 1954. 
The B.ugisu Cooperative Union is basically now in control-of the 
marketing, of the,Bugisu Arabica -Coffee. 
These early cooperative societies had weak leadership as was 
to be expected; they were often suspect and inept and their 
aspirations were illdefined. An official report in 1952 stressed the 
lack of leadership amongst them, for there was nobody "to teach these 
companies and associations the true meaning of cooperation ..... 
In respect of the Bugisu Cooperative Union, a commission of Enquiry 
in 1958 noted that great reliance by the Union upon Government was 
partly responsible for its inefficiency. The report said inter alia, 
"It needs to be remembered that the 
Bugisu Societies and the Union came 
into existence fairly rapidly, less 
under the impulse of self-defence 
against exploitation, but more because 
Government preached the gospel of 
cooperation. This partly explains why 
there is so much readiness to lay all 
dissatisfaction at the door of Government, 
and to wait for further help when really 
it is 'self-help' that would be better at 
2 this stage". 
1. Uganda Protectorate, .Commission of Enquiry into the Progress of 
Coop. Movement in Mengo^, Hasaka .& .Busoga- Districts, Entebbe," 19;52. 
2. Uganda Protect. Rpt. of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs 
of the Bugisu Coop. Union ltd. (19,58) paragraph 26, quoted in 
Ehrlich (paternalism) 0p. c'lt. p. 283. 
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The real problem of the movement at that time was that no 
systematic education had been given to the society members. One 
M.P.,Mr. M.E. Kawalya-Kagwa had lamented on this lack of education 
during his speech in Parliament in 1945. 
"Sir, I should like to draw attention to the 
fact that the introduction of a cash economy 
has disturbed the African Society and shaken 
to its very foundation our Social Customs. 
Unless the-African is trained in the new 
economy and the art of earning money and 
spending it wisely he will be ruined and 
his progress will be impossible". ^ 
Another M.P. reiterated this lack of business education among the 
Africans and commented thus: "This is not their fault for I do not 
think they have had a chance in commerce during the last twenty p 
years". 
It is signifact to note that ten years after the 1938 Cotton 
Report had opposed African participation in the ginning industry 
through cooperatives, by 1948, cooperation had acquired a new 
meaning in Governments scheme of things. Significant is the fact 
that post-war colonial policy was now directed to African 
Cooperative endeavours, and it was realised that "one of the most 
hopeful lines of advance for improvement of Commercial and trading 
activities by colonial peoples themselves lies in the expansion of 
cooperative practice. In one of his dispatches in 1946, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Rt. Honourable G.H. Hall 
had made an important statement on cooperatives. 
"The value of Cooperative Societies is no 
longer a matter of anty dispute. Both in . 
the U.K. and other European Countries in 
which the movement grew up, and in the 
countries to which it has later been 
transplanted, the benefits to be derived 
from a flourishing cooperative movement 
have proved themselves."^ 
Thus, the Uganda Government's paternal policy towards the 
cooperative movement in the country was part of the British Colonial 
policy in the post-war years, of fostering economic development in 
Britain's dependencies through cooperatives. The Labour Party's 
Socialist ideals largely influenced the British Administration of 
the 1940's, which had an abiding faith in cooperation as a means of 
economic development,. 
1." Proceedings in Parliament OP. cit. p. 13 
Ibid. Eob, 19, 1946, page 26 
3. Ehrlich (Marketing of Cotton in Uganda) op.cit. p.316 
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By the second half of the 1940's, the whole question of African 
participation in the ginning industry had taken a political tone and 
was now seen entirely in terms of African Cooperative enterprises, 
rather than individual entry by African businessmen Into the trades 
of the country. Henceforth, Government's attention was directed 
towards fostering these cooperative endeavours. It recognised this 
fact, when, in its comment on the 1948 Cotton Report, the Government 
maintained that 
"At the same time, the desire of the African 
Community to participate in the ginning 
industry is recognised and as a first step, 
it is proposed to arrange for ginneries, in 
areas to be selected, to process cotton 
belonging to growers from member societies" 
Government also, in 1948, made an important announcement to the 
effect that 
"His Excellency the Governor has given approval 
in principle to the proposal that a portion of 
£180,000 grant from the Cotton and Hard Coffee 
Control Eunds be given to the Buganda Government 
to be used to finance the acquisition of a 
ginnery to be operated by an approved group of 
Associations of Africans as/Cooperative Society." 
This proposal was a step In the right direction and marked the 
beginning of cooperative processing activities. Thus, far from 
challenging the cotton industry as was feared by the Immigrant 
Community, when the Cotton Commission of 1948 published its report, 
it was found that the cooperative movement would have to be 
supported specially with money drawn from funds withheld from 
peasant cotton and coffoe growers:; and far from being politically 
powerful as to be a source of embarrassment to the Government, the 
now 
movement is^largely dependent upon Government patronage. But the 
fear that the societies would involve Government in indirect 
participation in commerce appears to have been justified, because 
Government is now increasingly getting involved in schemes with which 
the cooperatives are associated. 
In September 1951, Government issued another proposal to 
reorganise the Cotton ginning industry^ with the following objectives: 
(a) To provide for participation by African Cooperatives in the ' 
ginning industry as far as possible. 
(b) To maintain and improve ginning standards and ensure that the 
industry is conducted efficiently and economically. 
1. Uganda Protectorate: Note on the Report of the Cotton Industry 
Commission, 1948, parag. 4. 
2. Ehr'lich, C. (Marketing of Cotton in Uganda) op. cit. p. 321 
3. Uganda Gns-tteo, Sept."27, 1951-
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In pursuance of the first objective, it was proposed that 
approximately twenty ginneries would be compulsDrily purchased 
from the private sector within; the next-, five years for handing over 
to African cooperatives. Since-Government assistance was to be 
given "only to ;'registered' "poopcraitives,; it is " easy to understand the' 
enthusiasm \vith.which people formed, cooperative societies, in order 
to reap the benefits of such' "Government'" assistance. • • 
-The 1951 proposals came into effect with the passage of two 
bills in 1952s The Cotton. Ordinance and the Acquisition of Ginneries 
Ordinance 1952. 
The most:important provision of the first bill was the 
conversion of the ginning, pools from voluntary into statutory 
organisations. The implication of this statutory recognition of 
the ginning pools was that ginners were now legally entitled to the 
shares they had been holding in the former pools. Buying in excess 
of these shares was an offence against the law. The Acquisition of 
Ginneries Ordinance provided for compulsory purchase by Government, 
of private ginneries for handing over to Africans. Section 16 (1) 
of the Act roads; 
"Soon after the specified date as is convenient, 
the Governor shall transfer,; subject to such 
terms- and conditions--a«-he-thinks---fit-to •impose, 
to an African cooperative'enterprise any under-
taking in respect of which notice has been given 
under the provisions of sub-section 2 of section 3 
of this Ordinance or which has been acquired "oy 
the Governor for the purpose of transfer to an 
African cooperative enterprise" 
Official assistance was, therefore, limited to cooperative societies; 
private Africans could not even qualify for aid under the clauses 
of the ordinance. Although the transfer was originally subject 
to a cooperative society raising of the capital cost of a ginnery, 
this condition was later modified, so that loans for the ginneries 
were granted by the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank (now Uganda 
Commercial Bank) which advanced 90% of the capital cost, repayable 
in 20 years at interest per annum, the other 10ft coming from 
the unions. Most cooperative unions found this 10fo by capitalising 
the commission payable to their member societies, for cooperative 
societies were very eager to take over the ginneries. In the five-
year period ending in 1957, upto twenty ginneries could be acquired 
for cooperative unions, provided their member societies were in a 
position to provide seed cotton equivalent to 2,400 bales of lint 
a year. Since the post-Independance period, the number of cooperative 
ginneries, as well as cooperative share of the cotton crop has been 
on the increase (Tables I and II) 
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Table Is Statistics.showing the rising percentages of 
Cooperative Cotton Quota, 1962/63 - 1967/68. 
(GROWTH CHART 01' COOPERATIVE COTTON SHARE, 1962/63 - 1967/68). 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 . • 
ZONES •63 ' 64 ' 65 '66 '67 oo VD 
1 WEST NILE 100 100 100 100 100 10© 
.2 WEST ACHOLI NIL 65 70 80 100 100 
3 EAST ACHOLI NIL 60 100 100 100 100 
4 LANGO 20 60 75 90 90 100 
5 TESO NIL 35 60 65 65 100 
6 SOUTH TESO(SEGREGATED) NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL ' 
7 USUKU NIL NIL NIL NIL NIL 100 
8 MBALE 41 55 60 70 70 100 
9 BUSOGA • 35 50 55 60 60 100 
.10 MENGO/ENTEBBE 15 25 28 40 40 80 
*11•MENGO/BURULI - - - - - 100 
12 MUBENBE 15 35 46 60 60 -
13 MASAKA NIL 65 70 100 100 100 
,14 BUNYORO 50 78 85 100 100 100 
**15 SINGO/MUBENBE/MWENGE/ 











. * Eor the 1967/68 crop year, Mengo/Buruli was carved 
out of Mengo/Entebbe zone. 
.** Other areas were added to Mubende zone in the 1967/68 
year to form the Singo/Mubende/Mwenge/Kyaka Zone. 
i .... All the ginning pools in areas where the cooperatives 
have acquired 100% take-over, have consequently, been 
wound up. 
Cotton Amendment Act, No.2, 1962, 30th Nov. 1962, 
Supplement ;to Uganda Gazette?-,; p. 15 
Legal Notice, No.299 of 1963, Laws of Uganda, 1963, 
Supplement to Gazettee, page 545-
Statutory Instrument 1964, No.256, Nov. 6, 1964, 
Laws of Uganda 1964, page 399. 
Cotton Commission Report, Uganda, 1966, p.25-
S.I. 1966, No,128, The specified percentage 
(Variation) Order, 1966, 26/8/66, Uganda Laws,. 1966, 
p.283. 
S.I. 1967, No.95, The Specified•Percentage 
(Variation) Order, 1967 of Sept. 27, 1967= 
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Table II; Statistics of Cooperative Ginneries; 1962/63 - 1967/68. 
CROP YEARS 






















1962/63 118 16 134 * 11.9 
1963/64 107 28 135 20.7 
1964/65 88 . 40 128 31.2 
1965/66 69 47 116 40. 5 
1966/67 60 4.5 105 42.8 
1967/68 27 43 70 61.4 
Source: L.M.B. Ginneries Records. 
In the coffee industry great impetus was given to cooperative 
participation by Government Notice of Proposals for the Reorgani-
sation of the Uganda Coffee Industry1. Under these proposals, 
25$ quota of clean coffee calculated from the output of coffee 
from the existing curing and hulling works was allocated to 
African enterprise. These proposals came into effect under the 
Coffee' Industry Act 19532. 
The Ordinance provided for the allocation of the first six 
curing works to Africans. In section 2 of the 1953 Act 
"association of growers" was defined as any registered cooperative 
society all of whose members are Africans or any other group of 
African growers of coffee which the Coffee Industry Board is 
satisfied collectively markets coffee in accordance with.cooperative 
principles. In spite of this definition, in actual fact, associa-
tions of growers are not legally regarded as cooperative societies. 
Thus, unlike the "Acquisition of Ginneries Ordinance"which limited 
the transfer of ginneries to cooperative societies, the Coffee 
Industry Ordinance provided for the allocation of coffce factories 
to both cooperative societies and individual Africans. It would 
appear, therefore, that right from the beginning Government was 
prepared to allow a choice between cooperatives and other businesses, 
and therefore, competition in the coff.eo industry. In this 
connection, the coffee industry provides an opportunity for the 
people to choose between alternatives. 
3 1952 Cooperative Amendment Law 
Six years after the cooperative movement had been given 
statutory recognition, it became necessary to get the cooperative 
members more closely associated with the administration and direction 
1. The Uganda Gazettee, Vol. XLV, No.42 of 18th July, 1952, 
General Notice, No.719 of 1952. 
,2. Laws of Uganda 1953, No. 21 of 1953, Coffee Industry Ordinance. 
3. Laws of Uganda, No.28 of 1952, pp. 317-330. 
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of "the movement. "Pollowing recommendations by the. Coma-±s«-ionr--pf 
Enquiry into the progress- of the movement in Mengo, Masaka andj 
Busoga Districts, the Amendment Act was passed in 1952- The Act 
provided for: 
a) The creation of the Uganda' Cooperative Development Council 
responsible for the general administration and direction of the 
movement. Registered cooperative marketing unions, consumer, 
thrift, and farming societies were, each to be represented on the 
council in a prescribed manner for a year. Other members of the 
council were the Commissioner for Cooperative Development, the 
Registrar,.the Senior Cooperative officer performing the duties of 
Accountant, and two other members appointed by the Governor. 
b) The splitting of the Administration of the Cooperative 
Department into two, between (i) The head of the Cooperative 
Department designated Commissioner for Cooperative Development and 
(ii) The Administrator - General made responsible for the 
registration of societies, and vested with the power to liquidate 
cooperative societies considered due for liquidation. The 
cancellation of the registration of a society could be done by the 
Registrar or by the Courts, upon application. The effect of this 
Act, in the main, was that the powers of the Registrar were, as it 
were, limited, and the Cooperative Development Council retained 
great responsibility over the movement. 
Government increased Interest in Cooperatives: 
The Cooperative Societies Act, 1963.1 
By 1963, cooperatives had become finally incorporated into the 
national policy as an ostensibly democratic way of positively 
promoting the development of the people, the resources and prosperity 
of the country. After seventeen years of Government's promotion of 
cooperatives, experience had shown that the Amendment Act was 
necessary for the following reasonss-
(1) To ensure and protect cooperative principles and prevent non-
cooperative practices creeping into the movement. 
(2) To protect cooperatives and encourage economic development 
among the people and, 
(3) To enable the Government to take active part in the development 
of the cooperative movement. Three years after the country had got 
its Independence, the indigenous government threw Its weight on the 
side of the cooperative movement as an instrument of economic and 
social policy. Among its many provisions, the Act abolished the 
Uganda Cooperative Development Council and shared its responsibilities 
between the cooperative apex organisations .(The "Uganda Cooperative 
Alliance and the Uganda Cooperative Central Union) and the Government. 
1. Uganda Laws, Cooperative Societies Act 1963, .. 
No.34 of 1963, pp.244 - 274. 
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Under the Act, the Registrar was empowered to determine the 
qualifications of cooperative societies' employees in order that 
only the "right" people could serve the movement. In part II, 
Section 3 (1) of the Act, "The Commissioner for Cooperative 
Development and The Deputy Commissioner for Cooperative Development 
shall be, respectively, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and 
Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies for the purposes of the 
- Act." Thus, the offices of Commissioner and Registrar were 
combined'in one and the"same person. While the Act has sought to 
make the.Government more concerned with the affairs of the 
movement, it has also made the iftovement "more democratic". The 
Committee that enquired into Busoga Growers' Union's affairs made 
this observation in respect of the Act. 
"Practically -all powers of control have been 
vested in the committees, a number of which 
have lacked competence or honesty;'"often both; 
and through the very limitations' of the law'" 
the department has. been as powerless as the 
;members ..to, institute any preventive measures 
— " ' ] ! 
aga inst incompetence and malpractices. ; 
iSections 47 to 51 of the Act seemingly provide 
the effective machinery of redress, but in 
.practice this is only • postmortal and not 
preventive or remedial".~ 
In fact, the Act invested the Registrar with wide .powers .over 
' the movement, but in:practice, the committees are allowed a large ; 
'"measure' of control, with"'the""re"suit 'that only when matters have gone 
really badly could the Registrar intervene. Since the passage of 
this Act, several landmarks' have been seen in the development of the 
movement. The Cooperative Credit Scheme started in 1962 has been 
intensified since 1964, while the Cooperative Group Parm Scheme, 
. inaugurated in 1964 has been expanded. These Schemes are instances 
: of the Central Government '"s" efforts in stimulating rural development 
programmes through kapital injection into agricultural projects as 
part of the economic development of the country. Government has 
.invested Vast sums of money•directly in the movement'through"loansi 
for capital expenditure,. working capital and crop finance. Eor the 
years 1962/63 to 1965/66r considerable amounts of'money have been"': 
;given to the district unions to acquire processing ..factories • and:-f or 
relendingto their member societies (Table III) and to societies, : 
under the credit and'group farming schemes. In the 1966/71 Second 
1. The Rpt. of the Committee of Enquiry into the Affairs of the 
Busoga Growers' Cooperative Union, 1965, P..8. The Committee was 
making a general observation in respect of the whole movement. 
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five-year plan, a sum,of £4.41 million has been earmarked for 
cooperative group farming;schemes cut of a total of £47.8 million, 
of the proposed Government expenditure on projects and programmes 
in the agricultural sector, thus representing 9-3/° of the overall 
estimated expenditure. The year 1964 saw the appointment of the first 
Ugandan as the Registrar of Cooperative Societies..and Commissioner 
for Cooperative Development. 'Another landmark in*the progress and 
growth of the movement was the registration in 1965, of other types 
of cooperative societies in the.country, such as the Taxi Drivers' 
cooperative society in Kampala, the.Building and Handicrafts 
Societies and the Eorest :Soeieties. In the same year 1965, there 
had occurred a coverage by the movement,- of all the Districts in 
the country, through the formation and registration of three growers' 
cooperative societies in Karamoja District. 
TABLE Ills STATISTICS 01 LOANS TO 
COOPERATIVES, 1962/63 TO 1965/66. 
TABLE 111(a) CREDIT SCHEME LOANS (PIGS. IN SHILLINGS) 
Total Loans from the . 
Uganda Credit & S. Bank* 
from 1st Nov. of the 
previous yerar to 31st 
October of current year. 
1963 1964 1965 1966 
814,955 1,689,357 5,186,503 6,024,986 
Recoveries during the 
period up to October 




Out s t a nd ing Amo unts 3 s 348 24,347 4,378,532 635,017 
Percentage Rate of 
Default 0.4 1.4 17 10. 5 
* The Bank is now known as the Uganda Commercial Bank. 
TABLE 111(b) GROUP EARM LOANS (PIGS. IN SHILLINGS) 
Lo.ans from the U.C.'S.B. 
from 1st Nov. of the 
previous year to 31st 
October of current year. 





Recoveries for the 
same, period 39,829 2,779 709,754 
Out st a nd ing Amounts 29,582 913,661 212,631 
Percentage Rate of 
Default. 42. 6 99-5 23 
1. D.G.R. .B'elshaws Proposals for Agrlc. Sectors .in. the current 
East African Development Plans: A Comparative Analysis, 
Table III, RDR No.26. 
- ' ! i . - '. I ' '- i 
tTHE .Ill(b) LOANS DISTRICT UNIONS INCUB FOR CAPITAL ASSETS AND 
CROP FINANCE (CENTRAL FINANCE) 
YEAR; CAPITAL FINANCE • CROP FINANCE • TOTAL 
SHS.: SHS. SHS. 
1963! '.18,156,215 : :65,002,567 .83,158,782 
: 1964: ; 3.9,347,386 , 98,893,0.00 138,24.0,386 
; 1965 :43,063,269 122,050,000 165,113,269 
- 1966 • 48,194, ;3 40 • 126,050,000 1^,140,440 
SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Department of Cooperative Development. 
Apart from crop marketing and crop production, the movement 
also engages in activities ancillary to marketing, such as thrift 
and loan and credit activities, as well as distributive services. 
The major activities of 'the- movement are, however, on the marketing 
of the country1 s two maj.or cash crops - coffee and cotton. 
Interest is also shown on the marketing of minor crops as a means 
of diversifying members' incomes and reducing the risks incidental 
» 
to reliance on the major cash crops whose world price levels are 
usually unstable and are determined by world market situations. 
As the movement grows bigger in membership and coverage 
(Table IV), it had become necessary to establish apex organisations 
to perform certain functions at a central level. Three such apex 
organisations have been formed. They are: 
(a) The Uganda Cooperative Central Union formed in 1961 for 
purposes of centralised trading on behalf of the member-unions and 
for . distributive, and supply ...services of the movement. 
(b) The Uganda Cooperative Alliance, set up in 1962 to promote 
cooperative education and .act as the. spokesman and representative 
of the entire movement on national and international issues affecting 
the organisation. The whole idea behind the formation of the 
Alliance is to provide a basis, for the eventual control of the 
movement by the movement itself when it is able to-'do so and divest 
the Government of its present responsibility^ over the cooperatives. 
How and when one can decide that the movement has reached the age of 
maturity is-another matter. 
(c") The Cooperative Bank of Uganda formed in 1964 to handle 
Cooperative Banking, especially, crop: financing in the country. 
* These are maximum liabilities District unions are authorised to 
incur and represent loans from banks, gauranteed by the Uganda 
Government. '...... 
; • ' ; ! " i 
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.So far, the ho-pes; placed on two .of the. apex organisations have 
not materialised. The Alliance has not been able to "project 
a favourable image of itself" to the movement. The affairs of the 
Alliance were found to be in a mess and a Commission of Enquiry set 
up in 19.66 into its v^orking, resulted in the appointment of a 
Supervising Manager in July 1966, to reorganise the Alliance. 
Similarly, the Cooperative Bank which ran into difficulties right 
from its inception, for lack of funds and mismanagement, is virtually 
dormant now. After a Commission of Enquiry into its affairs in 
December, 1965?.a Supervising Manager was, again, appointed to 
administer it. Enquiries were also set into the affairs of the. 
Bugis.u Cooperative Union the Uganda Growers' Cooperative Union, and the Busoga Growers' Cooperative Union. „ . . „ : 
the. result oi which was the appointment of Supervising Managers to 
manage the affairs of these unions. The reports of the Commissions 
of Enquiry into the first two unions have not yet been made public. 
Erom the report of the Busoga Committee of Enquiry, one has the 
impression that the movement is beset with a number of problems which 
hamper its efficiency. A Commission was, in 1967 set up to 
investigate the affairs of the whole movement and report thereupon. 
Until the Commission publishes its report, one is not in a position 
to comment on it. That the movement has had some'-disappointments, 
is however not in doubt. An editorial comment in this connection, 
in the Uganda Argus, on a seminar held in Makerere in 1966 is 'worth 
not ing. 
"Uganda is not the only country where there have 
been disappointments in the development of the 
cooperative industry, but it is important that 
the expensive lessons of the past are put to 
good use. In terms of size the: cooperatives in 
Uganda have undoubtedly succeeded...... But the 
fact that it has recently been necessary to 
appoint a Commission of Enquiry into cooperative 
unions is a sign that not everything iS well in 
them. It is certainly no commendation if a 
ginnery which has made good profits in private 
hands makes much'smaller profits or even a loss, l 
when it is taken over by a cooperative". 
CONCLUSION; 
In terms of numbers, the movement has grown tremendously. 
Erom about seventy-five primary societies regist'ei'ed in 1946, it has , 
by 1967, grown to an astronomical figure of 1970 primaries,•"with a 
large number of individual.members,. mostly farmers; thirty-one 
district unions, and three apex organisations. In the field of crop 
1. Uganda Argus, Sept. 29, 1966. 
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marketing, the movement has.the largest membership, especially in 
cotton marketing, where it has acquired virtual monopoly. 
It is an ivony of history that African peasant farmers who, 
before the advent of cooperatives, were bitterly opposed to the 
monopsony of non-Africans in the cotton industr5r arc. now in favour 
of the very situation they attacked many decades ago, because 
cooperatives are now in a sheltered position in the cotton industry 
with virtual absence of competition. In September 1S67, cooperatives 
were granted, by law, 100$ take-over of cotton buying in all the 
cotton Zones (except in Mengo/Entebbe Zone where the private sector 
is left with only 20% share of the crop). In the coffee industry 
(except Bugisu arabica coffee), where the private sector dominates, 
the movement is even clamouring for the limitation of competition 
in areas where cooperative societies and unions compete with private 
traders. Quite recently, new monopolies have been granted the 
movement in milk-processing. The main achievement of the movement 
lies in the redistribution of economic power, while its main problem, 
in the development effort, is efficiency. 
By encouraging the growth of the movement in the country the ll OW P 
Government is/merely giving an administrative fiat to an organisation 
that had sprung up spontaneously, though in a small way, but was 
denied normal entry into the business and trade of the country. 
The evidence presented in this paper therefore supports the view that 
the growth of the movement in Uganda was spontaneous, although 
Government1s continued paternalistic policy and supervisory role 
have all added momentum to its growth. In this 
oneoara gement, 
Government is not only giving the movement a great deal of financial 
support and. technical aid, but is also controlling it and using it 
as an instrument of social and economic development of the country. 
Although it is the intention of the Government to hand over the 
control of the movement to the movement itself as soon as the latter 
is ready for it, cooperatives are increasingly becoming dependent 
upon Government for direction, especially, because of the schemes 
with which the movement, is associated in rural development 
programmes. How soon the movement can become an autonomous 
organisation like the Banish Cooperatives is anybody's guess. REFERENCESi 
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